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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THIOKOL CHEMICAL CORPORA-
TION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff -1 ntervenor 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
LE GRANDE PETERSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
9912 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The instant action was brought in the First Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Box Elder County, by cross-appellant, Thiokol 
Chemical Corporation, attacking a privilege tax assessment 
made against it, by Box Elder County, on the basis that ( 1) 
the incidence of the tax was upon the United States; (2) 
that Thiokol was not subject to the tax; (3) the statute 
imposing the tax, 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, was unconstitu-
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tional as being discriminatory, and ( 4) that the tax was 
discriminatorily applied. The United States intervened 
and the Utah State Attorney General was served pursuant 
to 78-33-11, U. C. A. 1953. The appellant appeals from a 
decision adverse to it on point ( 4) mentioned and cross-
appellants, Thiokol Chemical Corporation and the United 
States, appeal essentially from an adverse decision on 
points ( 1) , ( 2) and ( 3) above mentioned. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The cross-appellant, Thiokol Chemical Corporation, 
paid the sum of $125,802.29 assessed taxes under protest 
to Box Elder County, and then sued to recover the return 
of the monies paid under protest challenging the assess-
ment on several grounds. The United States intervened 
and the Attorney General of Utah appeared in the action, 
pursuant to 78-33-11, U. C. A. 1953. Trial was had, with-
out jury, in the First Judicial District Court, Box Elder 
County, State of Utah, on February 6-7 and March 12, 
1963. On April 12, 1963, the Honorable Lewis Jones en· 
tered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (R. 245) 
and Judgment (R. 252). The court entered judgment against 
the appellant for the return of all the tax money paid 
under protest and interest thereon. The appellant appeals 
from so much of the judgment as orders return to respon· 
dents and cross-appellants of the protest payment, and re-
spondents and cross-appellants have appealed from the 
court's decision to the extent it holds Thiokol Chemical 
Corporation to be subject to the Utah privilege tax, 59-13· 
73, U. C. A. 1953, and that the statute is constitutional. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's deci-
sion awarding the respondent return of all tax monies paid 
under protest, or, in the alternative, reversal with instruc-
tions to the trial court to equalize the taxes paid by respon-
dent with other persons taxed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff below and respondent-cross-appellant 
herein, Thiokol Chemical Corporation, is a Delaware cor-
poration, authorized to do business in Utah, and was at 
the pertinent times herein doing business in Box Elder 
County (R. 204). Box Elder County officials, operating 
pursuant to 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, issued tax assessment 
No. D975 against the Thiokol Chemical Corporation assess-
ing certain personal property and fixtures at the Thiokol 
plant in Brigham City. (R. 204-206 and Exhibit A to plain-
tiff's complaint.) The assessment of tax due was in the 
sum of $125,801.29, and was for the taxable year 1961. On 
November 29, 1961, the Thiokol Chemical Corporation paid 
the tax assessment under protest (R. 205), and on May 21, 
1962, commenced this action for return of the money paid 
(R. 195). Subsequently, the United States intervened al-
leging ownership of the assessed property, challenging the 
constitutionality of the tax, and claiming a specific pecuni-
ary interest in the litigation (R. 214-18). The Utah Attor-
ney General entered under 78-33-11, U. C. A. 1953. 
The title to the property assessed is in the United 
~tates, but the Thiokol Chemical Corporation has posses-
mon of the property under the terms of a contract with 
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4 
the United States, and used the property for the purposes 
of performing its contract with the United States (Pl. Ex. 
1). The contract between Thiokol and the United States 
is a cost-plus-a fixed-fee contract (Pl. Ex. 6), and pro-
vides that the United States can supply certain special 
tooling and other equipment to Thiokol to be used "primar-
ily" for the work Thiokol is to perform under its contract 
for the United States (Pl. Ex. 6, R. 246). Nothing in the 
contract indicates that Thiokol must use the property "ex-
clusively" for the work being done for the United States 
(R. 79). The court found that pursuant to the contract, 
Thiokol would receive a profit of 3.76% of the cost of per-
forming the contract during 1961, and that the fee paid 
Thiokol by the United States for the year 1961 was in ex-
cess of $4,000,000.00. The court also found that the "cost" 
figure included overhead and some indirect overhead costs 
of Thiokol (R. 246) .1 The percentage figure for profit is 
a percentage of the overall cost of performing the contract 
(R. 153). 
Thiokol's contract is a research and development con-
tract for the production of the first stage of the Minuteman 
missile (R. 151). Stages two and three of the missile pro-
duction phase are produced by other private contractors 
who dovetail their work to fit with that of Thiokol (R. 
151). The final assembly of the missile occurs at Boeing 
Plant 77 at Hill Air Force Base, from where it is trans-
ported to firing silos ( R. 152) . 
The contract between the Air Force and Thiokol is 
lThe actual fee as testified to was $5,304,018.00 fo·r 1961, and $4,891.· 
740.00 for 1960 (R. 153). 
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generally written in broad terms. The Air Force Contract 
Administrator testified, ( R. 69) : 
HQ. And did the contract specify exactly how 
that research and development would be conducted? 
"A. No, sir, these contracts are in very broad 
terms. 
''Q. Specifying the end that was desired 
rather than the means by which the end would be 
achieved? 
''A. That is correct, sir." 
The Air Force only exercised general overall control, 
but left the technical performance of the contract up to 
Thiokol. In this regard, the trial judge expressly found, 
(R.246): 
"That in accordance with the provisions of said 
contract, the United States Air Force maintained 
general supervisory control over the activities of 
plaintiff in carrying out said contracts. However, 
plaintiff was expected to use initiative, diligence 
and managerial discretion so long as the best in.;. 
terests of the United States were served in the per-
formance of the specific terms of the contracts of 
the United States under which it received and used 
the assessed property." 
Thiokol was to be reimbursed by the United States for 
the cost of taxes it had to pay to Box Elder County; this 
was by virtue of a provision in the contract between Thio-
kol and the United States (Pl. Ex. 1). 
Thiokol is a profit corporation (R. 90, 246); it has 
been in existence since the late 1920's and conducts sub-
stantial operations in other fields besides government 
contracting (R. 92). Although salaries of personnel work-
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ing on the subject contract are "approved costs" under 
the contract, management salaries are not dictated by the 
United States (R. 94). 
The court received into evidence several special use 
leases (Exhibits 1-c, 1-h, 1-i, 1-j, 1-o, 1-q, 1-r, 1-u and 
1-v) by which the State of Utah leased state lands to pri-
vate persons or corporations for various purposes. Of 
those leases, Exhibits 1-c, 1-q, 1-r, 1-u and 1-v were taxed 
in accordance with Section 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953; how-
ever, the other leases received in evidence were not taxed (R. 
248) . All the leases covered lands owned by the State and 
located in various counties of the State. On the following 
leases not taxed under 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, evidence 
was presented that some commercial use was being made 
of the leased lands: Exhibit 1-H (a one acre experimental 
well being used in conjunction with turkey growing opera-
tions); 1-I (Sunset Beach resort); 1-J (a resort area); 
1-0, (Sunset Beach resort). Leases 1-I, 1-J and 1-0 were 
not granted with exclusive possession and 1-J was open 
to the public at large (Def. Ex. 10). ~he court did not 
find that this possible disparity of state leases was suffi-
cient to constitute discrimination. It noted, (R. 200): 
"* * * The court can't bring itself to the 
point of making a finding of fact in this case that 
because the tax people of Utah have only assessed 
the Southern Pacific Railroad on an easement and 
the Texas Company on three or four oil leases, and 
Thiokol, that this practice has been so acquiesced 
in by the tax people as to constitute discrimination 
in the legal sense. * * *" 
The evidence further disclosed that for the year in 
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7 
question, and as a standard practice, the State Land Board 
would make a list of state lands to which the State still 
held legal title, but which had been sold to private persons 
under contract (Plaintiff's Ex. 3 & 3A). This list would 
show the sale certificate number, the name and address of 
the purchaser, the legal description of the property, the 
purchase price and the equity of the purchaser. These lists 
are then eventually forwarded to the local county assessors 
for use in making assessments on state lands. This pro-
cedure was followed prior to the enactment of 59-13-73, U. 
C. A. 1953, and is based upon 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953. It 
was stipulated that none of the lands listed on Exhibit 3A 
for the year 1961 were taxed under 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 12 and 13 describe 190 parcels of state 
land sold under contract to private persons and stipulate 
to the testimony of Lee E. Young and Mark H. Crystal, 
employees of the State Land Board, as to use of the lands 
by the contract vendees. It was stipulated that none of 
these parcels were taxed under 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, 
but were taxed under 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, but only to 
the extent of the owners' equity rather than their full 
value, which is applicable to properties taxed under 59-
13-73, U. C. A. 1953. No evidence was introduced to show 
that comparable federal land leases or sales were being 
taxed any differently. It was upon this evidence of state 
lands under contract not being taxed that the trial court 
found that the tax under 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, was be-
ing discriminatorily applied (R. 249, para. 20). 
The evidence showed that the Box Elder County As-
sessor had not personally inspected the parcels of state land 
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8 
under contract of sale in Box Elder County (R. 249, para. 
18), but assessed these lands upon purchaser's equity alone. 
The State Tax Commission conducted an Assessor's 
School on December lOth and 11th, 1959. (Exhibit 7, p. 
24, etc.) At that school the local assessors were instructed 
to assess for tax purposes leases and possessory interests 
held by third persons of otherwise exempt entities. No in-
structions were given that assessors were to exclude lands 
sold by the State under contract; rather, "government 
owned" lands and facilities were expressly mentioned as 
being subject to the new privilege tax. (Exhibit 7, p. 24, 
etc.). 
The policy of the State Tax Commission was to direct 
taxation of all property encompassed by 59-13-73, U. C. A. 
1953 (R. 98). Mr. Max H. Kerr, Director of the Property 
Tax Division of the State Tax Commission, expressly 
noted, ( R. 98) : 
"Q. Is that policy any different as to any 
other tax exempt entity that may own the property? 
Say like state property, for example. 
"A. There's no difference between whether 
it is owned by the federal government or any other 
so-called exempt owner. 
"Q. Otherwise then there is a general across· 
the-board exercise of this tax rather than attempt-
ing to pinpoint it into any particular tax exempt 
entity; is that correct? 
"A. That is true." 
Mining companies (R. 98) and utilities (R. 101, Def. 
Ex. 10), were taxed where they possessed state leased prop· 
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erty. A specific direction was made by the Tax Commis-
sion to the Box Elder County Assessor advising him that 
a gravel pit was owned by Brigham City and leased, and 
that it was to be taxed (Pl. Ex. 9). 
The State specifically undertook a program of re-eval-
uation to determine property escaping taxation, including 
but not limited to that taxable under 59-13-73, U. C. A. 
1953 (R. 114, 118, 119). 
Some properties owned by tax exempt entities in Box 
Elder County, being specifically Brigham City and Box 
Elder County School District, that were leased to commer-
cial enterprises were not taxed (R. 247). However, the 
Box Elder Assessor testified that this was an oversight (R. 
179, 180) , and this evidence was not contradicted. His tes-
timony disclosed, ( R. 179) : 
"A. Oversight, I think, yes, sir. Since we did 
not receive any records from the Recorder's office 
of any property listed in their name, we don't have 
a record of it in our office, and it's been an over-
sight there. 
"Q. But you did have this letter which you 
read earlier dated January 6, 1960, from the State 
Tax Commission, did you not, Mr. Peterson? 
"A. That's right." 
The same witness further commented that he had 
failed to put a piece of property on the assessment rolls, 
that he had inquired of the Tax Commission as to its tax-
ability, apparently due to oversight (R. 179), nor was he 
aware of any other assessable property not assessed ( R. 
181). 
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Although the court apparently found one piece of prop-
erty in Box Elder County to be taxable under 59-13-73, U. 
C. A. 1953, being the property leased by S. L. Jeppson, 
Mr. Jeppson expressly testified this was "primarily" his 
home (R. 192). 
Finally, the evidence disclosed that the reason that 
state lands under contract of sale were not taxed under 
59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, was because their use was not 
known nor was the Box Elder County Assessor aware of 
their taxable status, but at least one employee of the State 
Tax Commission felt them covered, and no policy of ex-
emption had been adopted by the State Tax Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE THIOKOL CHEMICAL CORPORATION 
WAS TAXABLE UNDER SECTION 59-13-73, 
U. C. A. 1953, FOR THE PROPERTY POS-
SESSED IN CONNECTION WITH A GOVERN-
MENT CONTRACT AND DID NOT ACT UN-
DER THE CONTRACT AS THE ALTER EGO 
OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The Thiokol Chemical Corporation is an independent, 
private, profit seeking corporation, incorporated under the 
laws of Delaware, and authorized to do business in the 
State of Utah. The property assessed in the instant case, 
although federally owned, was in the possession of the 
Thiokol Chemical Corporation to be used "primarily" by 
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them in carrying out a profitable government contract. 
The Thiokol Corporation was free to use whatever engi-
neering and production techniques it desired so long as the 
end product met the requirements of the Air Force and 
specifically the Minuteman missile program. The contract 
between Thiokol and the United States (Pl. Ex. 6), pro-
vides, at page 1, that the government will provide : 
••Item 1 - Such Government-owned severable 
facilities as have been or may hereafter be fur-
nished to the Contractor by the Government from 
the Government Reserve." 
The machines and equipment are supplied to plaintiff and 
plaintiff has complete use of the equipment to carry out 
its functions. Part 9 of Contract, at page 13, reads : 
"The facilities furnished the Contractor under 
Supplemental Agreement Nr 10 are furnished pri-
marily for the performance of Contract Nr AF 33 
( 600) -36514 and supplemental agreements hereto." 
Etc. 
The contractor has the right to inspect and reject all un-
suitable facilities (Contract No. 15 Facilities Clause 2). 
The contractor has responsibility for maintenance, and has 
no liability for "loss of or damage to the" property ( Facili-
ties p. 3) . The right of possession to the property is com-
plete in Thiokol for the carrying out of its functions un-
der the contract. Under such circumstances, the Thiokol 
Chemical Corporation clearly had the beneficial control and 
possession of the property assessed and taxed. The trial 
court expressly found such as a matter of fact and ruled 
that as a matter of law Thiokol exercised sufficient control 
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and possession to be taxable under the Utah Privilege Tax 
Statute. 
59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, provides: 
"From and after the effective date of this act 
there is imposed and there shall be collected a tax 
upon the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed 
by any private individual, association, or corpora-
tion of any property, real or personal, which for any 
reason is exempt from taxation, when such property 
is used in connection with a business conducted for 
profit, except where the use is by way of a conces-
sion in or relative to the use of a public airport, 
park, fairground, or similar property which is avail-
able as a matter of right to the use of the general 
public, or where the possessor or user is a religious, 
educational or charitable organization or the pro-
ceeds of such use or possession inure to the benefit 
of such religious, educational or charitable organi-
zation and not to the benefit of any other individual 
association or corporation. No tax shall be imposed 
upon the possession or other beneficial use of public 
lands occupied under the terms of mineral or graz-
ing leases or permits issued by the United States 
or the state of Utah or upon any easement unless 
the lease, permit or easement entitles the lessee or 
permittee to exclusive possession of the premises 
to which the lease, permit or easement relates." 
It should be noted that the tax under this statute is 
imposed, not upon the tax exempt entity, but upon the non 
tax-exempt individual, association, or corporation having 
the possession or beneficial use of the property. Clearly, 
therefore, the tax was properly assessed and collected from 
Thiokol, unless some aspect of its relationship with the 
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United States under its contract otherwise prevented the 
imposition of the tax. 
The Utah statute was patterned after and is very simi-
lar to, a Michigan statute (Public Act of Mich., 189, 1953). 
The Michigan Statute was challenged in three cases going 
before the United States Supreme Court in 1958. The con-
stitutionality of the Michigan statute was upheld in these 
three cases. In United States v. Township of Muskegon, 
355 U. S. 484 ( 1958), one of the cases above referred to, 
the property possessed by the contractor, who was taxed, 
was held by the contractor pursuant to a government con-
tract, and its possession was for the purpose of satisfying 
such contract. The contractor and the United States ar-
gued that this was property not properly taxable under the 
U. S. Constitution2 since it would in effect lay the tax at 
the doorstep of the United States. In rejecting the conten-
tion, the Supreme Court commented, noting that the pos-
session of the contractor was no different merely because 
the property was possessed by virtue of a government con-
tract than other property it might use in conducting its 
business. It stated: 
''If under certain conditions the State can tax 
Continental for use of government property in con-
nection with its business conducted for profit-and 
as set forth in No. 26 we are of the opinion that it 
can-the fact that Continental was carrying out a 
contract with the Government does not materially 
alter the case. Continental was still acting as a pri-
vate enterprise selling goods to the United States. 
rrbe ~chigan courts had previously ruled that the statute applied to such 
J)OS!IeSslons. 
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In a certain loose way it might be called an 'instru-
mentality' of the United States, but no more so than 
any other private party supplying goods for his own 
gain to the Government. * * *" 
The use of the property in the instant case enables 
Thiokol to make a profit of between four and five million 
dollars a year. Although the performance of the contract 
is for the United States, the benefit is a mutual one be-
tween obligee and obligor. The Thiokol Chemical Company 
in no way acts as the alter ego of the United States. The 
independent profit 1notive is clearly the motive of Thiokol's 
activities rather than the governmental interest that would 
be present were this an alter ego situation. In the Mus-
kegon case, supra, the court stated the facts of that case 
which are extremely similar to those of the instant case: 
"* * * In 1952 it [United States] granted 
Continental Motors Corporation the right to use this 
plant in the course of performing several supply 
contracts Continental had with the Government. No 
rent was charged as such but Continental agreed 
not to include any part of the cost of the facilities 
furnished by the Government in the price of the 
goods supplied under the contracts." 
The court further noted that it makes no difference that 
the property is held under a permit or contract rather than 
a formal lease. Certainly, the possession and beneficial use 
of the property in the instant case being of such a nature 
as to allow the plaintiff to carry out its contract and re-
ceive a fixed fee is a beneficial use or possession. In Ameri-
can Motors Corp. v. Kenosha, 356 U. S. 21 (1958), the 
United States Supreme Court affirmed a tax of a general 
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pl'operty nature by the City of Kenosha. The tax, however, 
was imposed irrespective of title, upon the beneficial use. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the same case at 27 4 
Wise. 316, 80 N. W. 2d 363 ( 1957) found that a sufficient 
beneficial use from the following use of the property, and 
stated: 
"Under the terms of this contract the Company, 
in its private capacity, acquires materials needed 
for performance of the contract. In procuring such 
materials it does not act as purchasing agent for 
the Government and the Government incurs no re-
sponsibility to the vendor for payment of the pur-
chase price. If a partial payment is made, or has 
previously been made under the contract, title to 
all such property vests in the Government upon its 
acquisition by the Company." 
Utah cases have seemed to find a similar benefit to 
government contractors sufficient to impose a sales or use 
tax as the "ultimate consumer" of property to be used in 
government contract. Olson Construction Co. v. Tax Com-
mission, 12 U. 2d 42, 361 P. 2d 1112 ( 1961). There can 
be no claim that Thiokol does not have sufficient interest 
or use of the property to satisfy the statute. 
In the trial court the United States and Thiokol at-
tempted to bring themselves within the doctrine of United 
States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959) af-
firmed without opinion 364 U. S. 281 (1960). An analysis 
of that case shows its inapplicability to the instant factual 
situation. The case involved the imposition of the South 
Carolina sales and use tax. The court had before it a con-
tract between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Du-
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Pont Company. The contract concerned the construction of 
an atomic energy plant. All materials used in construction 
were purchased with appropriate funds, title passed to the 
United States on purchase and only $1.00 profit was to be 
given DuPont, and, finally, DuPont had authority to draw 
directly from government bank balances. In commenting 
on the contract in question, the lower federal court said: 
"These provisions of the contract are sufficient 
to show that the lengthy document is unusual. It 
was entered into by a contractor without hope of 
gain, except the nominal one dollar, payable upon 
final completion of the contract, but upon whom 
was imposed no risk of loss. DuPont was not even 
required to lend its credit or its funds. That it was 
contemplated that DuPont would act as the alter 
ego of the Commission is further suggested by the 
contract requirement that DuPont include in sub-
contracts a number of provisions applicable to pub-
lic contracts. * * *" 
In the instant case there is a profit motive by an in-
dependent business organization whose internal controls 
and actions on the project are left to itself and are not in-
timately supervised by the United States so long as the 
end product meets the consumptive needs of the United 
States. Thiokol has complete freedom. Finally, no sales tax 
is involved, but rather one obviously on beneficial use and 
possession. In United States v. Boyd, 363 S. W. 193 (Tenn. 
1962) , the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed a suit to 
recover taxes paid under protest. In rejecting the alter 
ego theory advocated by the United States and, hence, the 
Livingston case, supra, the court commented on the inap· 
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plicability of that case to the usual government service 
contract. The court noted : 
"The main contention of the appellants is that 
we are bound by the decision of the U. S. District 
Court in United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 
9, affirmed without opinion, 364 U. S. 281, 80 S. 
Ct. 1611, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1719 (1959). That case in-
volved a South Carolina sales and use tax upon Du-
Pont Corp. in its operations under a similar con-
tract with the A. E. C. We are not persuaded that 
the holding of that case should be followed here, 
because both in the facts and the South Carolina 
and Tennessee taxing statutes substantial differ-
ences appear. There DuPont undertook to design, 
construct, and operate a plant for the A. E. C. for 
a fee of only $1.00. The Court in that case found 
that DuPont entered the contract from motives of 
public responsibility, and that it was the intention 
of the parties that DuPont would act as agent or 
'alter ego' of the A. E. C. in that project. The Court 
concluded that DuPont itself lacked a separate tax-
able interest. 
"We do not wish to ignore any patriotic motives 
that may exist, but we find in this record no indi-
cation that the appellant Carbide continues its con-
tract or that appellant Ferguson entered its contract 
with any primary motive other than that of the nor-
mal business transaction. Carbide's yearly fee, 
above allowable costs, is $2,751,000.00 and Fergu-
son's fee, negotiated from time to time, is equally 
substantial as it appears in the supplemental agree-
ments to the Ferguson contract. In addition, we 
feel that Carbide, contrary to DuPont in the Liv-
ingston case is deriving substantial indirect benefit 
that will enable it to maintain a position of indus-
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trial leadership as atomic energy finds more uses in 
non-defense fields." 
Similarly, in the present case, a large fee is paid, and 
Thiokol is in competition with other companies in the mis-
sile industry, and has opportunity to gain a substantial po-
sition in the missile defense industry. The contract (p. 
2-2) provides for rehnbursement of both direct costs and 
indirect costs (except where the latter are purely without 
direct relevance to the contract to be performed, or the 
benefits so received are additional to the contract). A cost-
plus-a-fixed-fee contract is provided for by Congress under 
10 U. S. C. 2306 (d). Under such contracts for military 
procurement, or other contracts under Title 10 U. S. C., 
Chapter 137, the contractor receives a fee based on the 
percentage of estimated cost. Department of the Army 
Pamphlet 27-153, Procurement Law, notes at page 170: 
"The cost-plus-a-fixed-fee, or 'CPFF', contract 
is a cost contract which provides a profit, called a 
'fee', to the contractor in addition to the reimburse-
ment of his allowable costs. The fee is 'fixed', i.e., 
it is a set sum, based on the estimated cost of per-
formance of the contract. The fixed fee does not 
vary with actual cost of performance, but may be 
adjusted as a result of subsequent changes in the 
work or services to be performed under the con-
tract. The fixed fee must be approved by the Head 
of a Procuring Activity or his designee and may 
not be greater than 7 per cent of the estimated cost 
of performance (exclusive of the fee) in contracts 
generally, or 10 per cent of the estimated cost of 
performance (exclusive of fee) in the case of ex-
perimental, developmental or research work, except 
that fees up to 10 per cent and 15 per cent respec-
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tively may be authorized by the Secretary of the 
Military Department or his designees. The term, 
'fee', regarding architect-engineer type contracts is 
used to designate the architect or engineer's costs of 
performance and profit. This fee may not exceed 
6 per cent (exclusive of the architect-engineer fees) 
of the estimated cost of the part of the public works 
or utility project to which the architect or engineer-
ing services pertain. Since the contractor's fee in 
all CPFF contracts is based on estimated costs and 
may not change with actual costs, accurate cost es-
timates are important." 
Additionally, the Armed Services Procurement Regu-
lations allow coverage for indirect costs. A.S.P .R. 15-203, 
and the Comptroller General of the United States has ruled 
that indirect costs, based on actual overhead, although re-
negotiated after performance, are allowable. 35 Comp. Gen. 
434 (1956). Further, the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulations recognize the "fee" as "profit". A.S.P .R. 3-
404.3(c). A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract guarantees a 
"profit" to the contractor at a specified percentage. Be-
cause the profit is not wide open (nor the possibility of a 
loss immediate), the plaintiff cannot contend the use of 
the property taxed in the instant case was not for a busi-
ness conducted "for a profit", and that they are somehow 
the alter ego of the United States. To adopt the respon-
dent's position would free every government contractor 
from state taxation merely because public work was in-
volved. 
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POINT II. 
THE SUBJECT ASSESSMENTS DO NOT IN-
FRINGE UPON FEDERAL IMMUNITY FROM 
STATE TAXATION. 
The respondents and cross-appellants alleged in their 
complaints that the Utah privilege tax violates the immun-
ity of the Federal Government from state taxation. The 
trial court ruled contrary to their contention. A simple ex-
amination of the pertinent provisions of the Utah statute, 
59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, demonstrates that the statute itself 
places no direct tax upon the United States. The statute 
imposes the tax "upon the possession or other beneficial 
use enjoyed by any private individual, association, or cor-
poration of any property, real or personal, which for any 
reason is exempt from taxation, when such property is 
used in connection with a business conducted for profit." 
Consequently, the tax is imposed against the "individual as-
sociation or corporation", not the United States or other tax 
exempt agency. It is submitted that the instant statute 
in no way places the incidence of the tax upon the United 
States and, hence, does not fall within the category of taxes 
outlawed by McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 
316 (1819); Weston v. City of Charleston, 27 U. S. (2 
Pet.) 448 (1829). The Supreme Court of the United States 
in Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941), ap-
proved a sales tax imposed by Alabama on federal contrac-
tors who purchased supplies to be used in the construction 
of government facilities, and which were purchased for the 
purpose of satisfying government contracts. Under the 
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contracts in question, as is the instant case, the tax burden 
was passed on to the United States. In holding that such 
taxation did not violate the prohibition against taxing the 
United States, the Supreme Court stated: 
"* * * The asserted right of the one to be 
free of taxation by the other does not spell immun-
ity from paying the added costs, attributable to the 
taxation of those who furnish supplies to the Gov-
ernment and who have been granted no tax im-
munity." 
The court further noted : 
"We cannot say that the contractors were not, 
or that the Government was, bound to pay the pur-
chase price, or that the contractors were not the 
purchasers on whom the statute lays the tax. The 
added circumstance that they were bound by their 
contract to furnish the purchased material to the 
Government and entitled to be reimbursed by it for 
the cost, including the tax, no more results in an 
infringement of the Government immunity than did 
the tax laid upon the contractor's gross receipts 
from the Government in James v. Dravo Contract-
ing Co., 302 U. S. 134, * * *, supra. See Met-
calf & Eddy v. Mitchell, supra (260 U. S. 523, 524, 
* * *); Trinity/arm Constr. Co. v. Grosjean, 
supra (291 U .. S 472, * * *); Helvering v. 
Gerhardt, supra (304 U. S. 416, * * *); Graves 
v. Ne'W York, supra (306 U. S. 483, * * *) ." 
Consequently, the plaintiff cannot argue that because, 
under its contract with the United States, the latter picks 
up the tab, this somehow changes the tax to one against 
the United States. The tax is clearly on the user-possessor, 
and under Section 59-13-75, U. C. A. 1953, does not become 
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a lien on the property itself. In U. S. v. Allegheny, 322 
U. S. 174 (1944), the Supreme Court again noted: 
"* * * Nor is the validity of the tax de-
pendent upon the ultimate resting place of the eco-
nomic burden of the tax." 
In the latter case, the court reserved for decision the ques-
tion of whether a tax levied on the possession or beneficial 
use of government property could be upheld. However, in 
several recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has 
expressly held that statutes almost identical with Section 
59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, did not violate the privilege of the 
United States from taxation by states. The act involved 
in some of the cases was Michigan Public Act 189, which 
provided: 
"When any real property which for any reason 
is exempt from taxation is leased, loaned or other-
wise made available to and used by a private indi-
vidual, association or corporation in connection with 
a business conducted for a profit, except where the 
use is by way of a concession in or relative to the 
use of a public airport, park, market, fair ground 
or similar property which is available to the use of 
the general public [sic], shall be subject to taxation 
in the same amount and to the same extent as 
though the lessee or user were the owner of such 
property." 
The similarity of the instant statute to the present Utah 
statute is obvious. In United States v. City of Detroit, 355 
U. S. 466 (1958), the United States Supreme Court upheld 
the statute as against a claim, the same as that made below 
by respondents, that the statute invades the province of 
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federal immunity from local taxation. In the case, realty 
was leased by Borg Warner Co. from the United States. 
The court noted : 
"* * * In general terms this statute, Public 
Act 189 of 1953, provides that when tax-exempt 
real property is used by a private party in a busi-
ness conducted for profit the private party is sub-
ject to taxation to the same extent as though he 
owned the property. 
"* * * 
"The Michigan statute challenged here imposes 
a tax on private lessees and users of tax-exempt 
property who use such property in a business con-
ducted for profit. Any taxes due under the statute 
are the personal obligation of the private lessee or 
user. The owner is not liable for their payment nor 
is the property itself subject to any lien if they re-
main unpaid. So far as the United States is con-
cerned as the owner of the exempt property used 
in this case it seems clear that there was no attempt 
to levy against its property or treasury. * * * 
"It is undoubtedly true, as the Government 
points out, that it will not be able to secure as high 
rentals if lessees are taxed for using its property. 
But as this Court has ruled in James v. Dravo Con-
tracting Co., 302 U. S. 13, * * *, Alabama v. 
King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, * * *, and num-
erous other cases, the imposition of an increased 
financial burden on the Government does not by 
itself, vitiate a state tax. 
"* * * 
"Today the United States does business with a 
vast number of private parties. In this Court the 
trend has been to reject immunizing these private 
parties from nondiscriminatory state taxes as a 
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matter of constitutional law. Cf. Penn-Dairies v. 
Milk Control Commission, 318 U. S. 261, 270, 
* * * Of course this is not to say that Con. 
gress, acting within the proper scope of its power, 
cannot confer immunity by statute where it does 
not exist constitutionally. Wise and flexible adjust· 
ment of intergovernmental tax immunity calls for 
political and economic considerations of the greatest 
difficulty and delicacy. Such complex problems are 
ones which Congress is best qualified to resolve. 
As the Government points out Congress has already 
extensively legislated in this area by permitting 
states to tax what would have otherwise been im· 
mune. To hold that the tax imposed here on a pri· 
vate business violates the Government's constitu. 
tional tax immunity would improperly impair the 
taxing power of the State." 
A similar case to the instant one was United States v. 
Township of Muskegon, 355 U. S. 484 (1958), where the 
court noted, as respects the same Michigan tax statute: 
"In this case the United States owns a manu-
facturing plant at Muskegon, Michigan. In 1952 it 
granted Continental Motors Corporation the right 
to use this plant in the course of performing several 
supply contracts Continental had with the Govern-, 
ment. * * * 
"On January 1, 1954, Continental was assessed 
a tax under Public Act 189. As in No. 26, this tax 
was levied because of Continental's use of tax-ex-
empt property in its private business and was mea-
sured by the value of the exempt property which it 
was then using. Continental refused to pay the 
tax and this suit was brought by state authorities 
in a state court to recover the amount assessed. The 
United States intervened, contending that the tax 
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was invalid because it imposed a levy on govern-
ment property. But the lower court rejected this 
contention and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. 
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, 346 Mich. 
:.!18, 77 N. W. 2d 799. \Ve noted probable jurisdic-
tion of an appeal from this decision by both Conti-
nental and the United States, 352 U. S. 963, * * *, 
and now affirm the judgment below on the basis of 
our decision in No. 26. 
''There are only two factual differences be-
tween this case and No. 26. First, Continental is 
not using the property under a formal lease but 
under a 'permit'; second, Continental is using the 
property in the performance of its contracts with 
the Government. We do not believe that either fact 
compels a different result. 
"Constitutional immunity from state taxation 
does not rest on such insubstantial formalities as 
whether the party using government property is 
formally designated a 'lessee.' Otherwise immunity 
could be conferred by a simple stroke of the drafts-
man's pen. * * * 
"If under certain conditions the State can tax 
Continental for use of government property in con-
nection with its business conducted for profit -
and as set forth in No. 26 we are of the opinion 
that it can - the fact that Continental was carry-
ing out a contract with the Government does not 
materially alter the case. Continental was still act-
ing as a private enterprise selling goods to the 
United States. In a certain loose way it might be 
called an 'instrumentality' of the United States, but 
no more so than any other private party supplying 
goods for his own gain to the Government. In a 
number of cases this Court has upheld state taxes 
on the activities of contractors performing services 
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for the United States even though they were closely 
supervised in performing these functions by the 
Government." 
In City of Detroit V. Murray Corp., 355 U. S. 489 
( 1958) , a third and companion case to the other two dis-
cussed, the court again had the same Michigan statute be-
fore it. The court noted: 
"In 1952 Murray Corporation was acting as a 
sub-contractor under a prime contract for the man-
ufacture of airplane parts between two other pri-
vate companies and the United States. From time 
to time Murray received partial payments from the 
two prime contractors as it performed its obliga-
tions under the subcontract. By agreement, title to 
all parts, materials and work in process acquired 
by Murray in performance of the subcontract vested 
in the United States upon any such partial payment, 
even though Murray retained possession. 
"On January 1, 1952, the City of Detroit and 
the County of Wayne, Michigan, each assessed a 
tax against Murray which in part was based on the 
value of materials and work in process in its pos-
session to which the United States held legal title 
under the title-vesting provisions of the subcontract. 
Murray paid this part of each tax under protest and 
then sued in a Federal District Court for a refund 
from the city and county. It contended that full 
title to the property was in the United States and 
that the taxes infringed the Federal Government's 
immunity from state taxation to the extent they 
were based on such property. The Government in-
tervened on Murray's behalf. * * * 
"We believe that this case is also controlled by 
the principles expressed in our opinion in Nos. 26 
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and 87, ante, pp. 424 and 486, and that the taxes 
challenged here do not violate the Constitution. 
These taxes were not levied directly against the 
United States or its property. To the contrary they 
were imposed on Murray, a private corporation, 
and there was no effect to hold the United States 
or its property accountable. * * * 
"* * * 
·' * * * Of course the Government will even-
tu:-llly feel the financial burden of at least some 
of the tax but the one principle in this area which 
has heretofore been clearly settled is that the im-
position of an increased financial burden on the 
Government does not by itself invalidate a state 
tax." 
In American Motors Corp. v. Kenosha, 356 U. S. 21 
(1958), the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
imposition of a personal property tax on a government 
contractor on property he used carrying out a government 
contract where legal title to the property was in the United 
States, but the contractor had possession to enable him to 
manufacture airplane parts. 
The substance of all these cases was aptly summed up 
in General Dynamics Corp. v. County of L. A., 330 P. 2d 
794 (Cal. 1958), where the California Supreme Court 
stated: 
"It is now settled that a private contractor's 
right to use government property may be made the 
subject of a nondiscriminatory tax measured by the 
value of the property used even though the economic 
burden of the tax falls on the United States." 
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Since the Utah statute, Section 59-13-73, does no more 
than what the United States Supreme Court has allowed , 
no claim that the immunity of the Federal Government has 
been encroached upon can be sustained. 
The annotation in 2 L. Ed. 2d 1789, notes that the pres-
ent trend of decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
has "been to reject immunizing private parties doing busi-
ness with the United States from nondiscriminatory state 
taxes as a matter of constitutional law." 
In Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U. S. 495 
( 1953), the appellant, a private corporation, entered into 
a contract, with the United States for a definite fee, to 
store government owned gasoline. The Federal Govern-
ment assumed liability under the contract for all state 
taxes. Tennessee levied a special gasoline privilege tax on 
the gasoline stored. The United States and the contractor 
claimed the tax on the government gasoline was barred by 
sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court rejected the con· 
tention, citing James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 
134 (1937), for the proposition that merely because the 
ueconomic burden" of the tax is transferred to the United 
States, because of some contractual provision, the "inci-
dence of the tax" is not thereby imposed on the United 
States. The court cogently commented : 
"* * * There is no claim of a stated im· 
munity. And we find none implied. The United 
States, today, is engaged in vast and complicated 
operations in business fields, and important pur-
chasing, financial, and contract transactions with 
private enterprise. The Constitution does not ex-
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corporations or individuals, contracting with the 
United States, merely because their activities are 
useful to the Government. We hold, therefore, that 
sovereign immunity does not prohibit this tax." 
See also Offutt Housing Co. v. Sarpy County, 351 U. S. 253 
(1956). It should also be noted that if the tax becomes de-
linquent it does not become a burden on the exempt prop-
erty, 59-1:~-75, 76, U. C. A. 1953. 
Since the Michigan tax cases have decisively laid to 
rest any claim of unconstitutionality in this area, cross-ap-
pellant's position is without merit. 
POINT III. 
SECTION 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, IS NOT UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL, AS BEING IN VIOLATION 
OF EITHER THE FEDERAL OR STATE CON-
STITUTIONS. 
The respondents and cross-appellants contend that Sec-
tion 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, imposes a discriminatory tax 
and improperly exempts various classes from the tax, thus 
violating Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
The trial court decided the issue contrary to their asser-
tions. 
Every construction of a statute favors the presump-
tion of constitutionality. Sutherland, Statutory Construc-
tion, 3rd Ed., Sec. 4509. This is true whether the statute 
is being weighed against the Federal Constitution, Butt .. 
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field v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904); Davies Ware-
house Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 144 (1944); Ex Parte Endo, 
323 U. S. 283 (1944), or the Constitution of this state. Salt 
Lake City v. Tax Commission, 11 U. 2d 359, 359 P. 2d 397 
(1961). Consequently, every presumption favors the posi-
tion that the instant legislation was drawn with a reason-
able view towards constitutionality. 
In Untermeyer v. Tax Commission, 102 Utah 214, 129 
P. 2d 881, (1942), the Utah Supreme Court stated, as to 
the requirement of uniformity in taxation under Article I, 
Section 24, of the State Constitution : 
"We also hold the tax does not violate the 'uni-
formity clause' Section 24, Article I, of the state 
constitution. The significance of this clause is well 
expressed on pp. 818, 819 of Vol. 5, Calif. Juris-
prudence where it states: 
" 'The word "uniform" in the section of the 
constitution under consideration does not mean uni-
versal. The provision intends simply that the effect 
of general laws shall be the same upon all persons 
who stand in the same relation to the law. It has 
been repeatedly held that a law is general which 
applies to all of a class - the classification being a 
proper one - and that the requirements of uniform-
ity is satisfied if it applies to all of the class alike.' 
"As applied to taxation statutes such constitu-
tional provision requires only that the tax shall fall 
equally upon all similarly situated." 
If a proper reason for legislative differentiation or 
classification exists, the uniformity provision is not vio· 
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lated. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920; State v. 
J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
The burden of proof of showing a discriminatory classifi-
cation rests on the plaintiff and intervenor. State v. J. B. 
& R. E. ~Valke-r, Inc., supra. A similar standard is imposed 
by the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. 
Thus, in Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 27'7 U. S. 32, 
;_;; ( 19:28), the United States Supreme Court stated that a 
state's power to classify for purposes of taxation is 
... • • of wide range and flexibility." 
In Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 
237, (1890), the court said that the Constitution does not 
prevent a state : 
"* * * from adjusting its system of taxa-
tion in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if 
it chooses, exempt certa,in classes of property from 
any taxation at all, such as churches, libraries and 
the property of charitable institutions. It may im-
pose different specific taxes upon different trades 
and professions, and may vary the rates of excise 
upon various products; it may tax real estate and 
personal property in a different manner; it may tax 
visible property only, and not tax securities for pay-
ment of money; it may allow deductions for indebt-
edness, or not allow them. All such regulations and 
those of like character, so long as they proceed with-
in reasonable limits and general usage, are within 
the discretion of the state legislature, * * * " 
The claim made below was that the Utah statute de-
nied equal protection of the laws and was not uniform be-
cause of an arbitrary classification of exemptions. In order 
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for the position of respondents-cross-appellants to be valid 
' the provisions for exemption under the Utah statute, 59-
13-73, U. C. A. 1953, would have to be arbitrary. In the 
trial court, respondents did not contend that all the exemp-
tions were arbitrary, rather only those exemptions were 
attacked that relate to religious, educational or charitable 
organizations, to the degree they excluded the United 
States. It was claimed, relying on the dissenting opinion 
of Robson, D. J. in United States and Olin Mathieson Chem-
ical Co. v. Department of Revenue, 202 F. Supp. 757, 761 
(Ill. 1962), that the United States was a monumental char-
ity and, therefore, should be treated in a class with other 
eleemosynary institutions. The overwhelming weight of 
authority is to the contrary. 
The general rule in this area is noted in 51 Am. Jur., 
Taxation, Sec. 522 : 
"It seems generally to be assumed that consti-
tutional requirements of equality and uniformity in 
taxation do not preclude the legislature from pro-
viding general tax exemptions for the property of 
charitable, educational, and religious institutions 
and corporations devoted to public uses and pur-
poses, since through such institutions and co~por~­
tions the state is relieved of a burden which It 
would otherwise be obliged to bear. * * *" 
The United States Supreme Court in Bell's Gap R. Co. 
v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237 (1890), expressly so 
recognized, and several federal cases have at least implic-
itly upheld these exemptions. St. Anna's Asylum v. New 
Orleans, 105 U. S. 362 (1882); Northwestern University 
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v. Illinois, 99 U. S. 309 (1878); Home of the Friendless v. 
Rousr. 8 (\Vall) ·130 (1869). There is also no impediment 
to such an exemption under Utah law, Parker v. Quinn, 23 
Utah 332, 64 Pac. 961 ( 1901); Odd Fellows Bldg. Assn. v. 
Naylor, f'>3 Utah 111,177 Pac. 214 (1918); Salt Lake Lodge 
v. Grorsbeck, 40 Utah 1, 120 Pac. 192 (1911); Wey v. Salt 
Lake City, 35 Utah 504, 101 Pac. 381 (1909); Art. XIII, 
St'c. :!, Utah Constitution, 59-2-1, U. C. A. 1953. 
In a recent case, exemptions of a similar nature to 
those of the Utah statute in question were upheld, being 
included in the Illinois Retailers Occupation Tax, in United 
States and Olin Mathieson v. Department of Revenue, 
(1962, N. D. Ill.). A three judge federal court noted: 
"We iterate briefly the principles applied in 
our first opinion. Tax exemptions are founded on 
public policy and are granted for the accomplish-
ment of public purposes which will benefit the pub-
lic generally. Tax exemptions are subject to the 
limitation that they and the classification upon 
which they are based be reasonable, not arbitrary, 
and apply to all persons similarly situated. 
''The exemption accorded to non-governmental 
institutions operated for charitable, religious and 
educational purposes is not of recent origin, but is 
the continuance of an old and well-established pub-
lic policy. * * * 
"The exemption of these institutions encour-
ages their existence and relieves the State of the 
heavy burden of maintaining and performing these 
essential services. Article VIII, Sec. 3 of the Con-
stitution of the State of Illinois forbids the use of 
public funds in the 'aid of any church or sectarian 
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purposes' nor may 'any grant or donation of land , 
money or other personal property ever be made by 
the state or any such public corporation, to any 
church, or for any sectarian purpose.' Obviously, a 
distinct dissimilarity exists between religious insti-
tutions and governmental bodies. While charitable 
and educational objectives can, and are, performed 
through governmental units, the revenue to support 
them is derived from the power and authority of 
the government to tax its citizens for the public wel-
fare. But no compulsory process exists to exact 
contributions to non-governmental organizations 
dedicated to the moral, spiritual and physical well-
being of mankind. The financial resources to ac-
complish their objectives are derived from the con-
cept of giving voluntarily - without legal obliga-
tion or compulsion. This difference forms a reason-
able basis for a separate classification and the ex-
emption, therefore, does not discriminate against 
governmental bodies. 
"We are in accord with the holding of the Su-
preme Court of Illinois that the classification of 
governmental units and these non-governmental 
units is indeed separate and distinct, and that there 
is a reasonable classification based on differences 
between them; that Sec. 441 of the Illinois Retail-
ers' Occupation Tax Act which did not exempt re-
tailers who sold to the federal government but did 
exempt retailers who sold to charities, schools and 
churches is not unconstitutional for that reason." 
This decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme 
Court, 371 U. S. 21. The Supreme Court apparently re-
jected in toto Judge Robson's dissent. Consequently, it is 
clear that such exemptions as are provided under the 
Utah statute result in no constitutional infirmity. See also, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
People n· rd. Holland Coal Co. v. Isaacs, 22 Ill. 2d 477, 
176 N. E. 2d 889 (1961).8 
It is obvious that no merit exists to respondents and 
cross-appellants' position on this point, and the trial court's 
favorable determination should be upheld. 
POINT IV. 
THERE IS NO DISCRil\JIIN ATION IN APPLI-
CATION OF 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953 ON ITS 
FACE BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES IS 
TREATED EQUALLY WITH OTHER GOV-
ERNMENTAL ENTITIES AND 59-13-73, U. C. 
A. 1953, REPEALS 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, TO 
THE DEGREE IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE FORMER. 
The trial court ruled that 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, was 
on its face non-discriminatory. This is clearly a correct 
result since, as has been noted during the discussion in 
this brief on various other points, 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, 
in no way singles out the United States for any different 
treatment than that accorded any other tax exempt entity, 
and especially is this so where the State of Utah and the 
United States are treated the same under the statute. In 
PhiUips Chemical Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U. S. 376 
8Although no attack was raised on other portions of the statute, .. it is clear 
such recognied legislative diistinc.tions do not constitute unconstitutional 
discrimination. McGowan V. Maryland, 3 66 U. S. 420 (1960). The 
general exemptions found in the statute have been upheld as valid in various 
similar instances. Martin V. Collingswood, 36 N. S. 447, 177 A. 2d 759 
(1962) (concession in public park); Rockwell Sprinq f1 Axle Co. v. 
Romulus Township. 365 Mich. 632. 114 N. W. 2d 166 (1962) (airport 
hangar on state university); Sproul V. Gilbert, 359 P. 2d 543 (Ore. 
1961) (grazing on state and federal lands); Rummel V. Musgrave, 350 
P. 2d 825 (Colo. 1960) (mining enterprises). 
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(1960), the United States Supreme Court had before it a 
claim that a Texas statute, imposing a "use" type tax was 
discriminatory. However, the statute was entirely differ-
ent than the statute now before the court. First, a differ-
ent tax rate was imposed on lessees of state land as distinct 
from those of the Federal Government. The court noted 
as to the provisions of Texas law involved: 
"As construed by a majority of the Texas 
court, this provision is an affirmative grant of au-
thority to the State and its political subdivisions to 
tax private users of government realty. While the 
subject of the tax is the right to the use of the prop-
erty, i.e., the leasehold, its measure is apparently 
the value of the fee. The constitutionality of the 
provision, thus construed, depended upon the court's 
interpretation of our decisions in the Michigan cases 
two terms ago, where we held that a State might 
levy a tax on the private use of government prop-
erty, measured by the full value of the property. 
United States v. Detroit, 355 U. C. 466, * * *; 
United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 
484, * * *; cf. Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 
u. s. 489, * * *. 
"However, three members of the Texas court, 
joined by a fourth on petition for rehearing, were 
of the opinion that under the majority's construc-
tion the statute discriminates unconstitutionally 
against the United States and its lessees. Their con· 
elusion rested on the fact that Article 7173 of the 
Revised Civil Statutes of Texas imposes a distinctly 
lesser burden on similarly situated lessees of ex· 
empted property owned by the State and its politi· 
cal subdivisions. We agree with the dissenters' 
conclusion. 
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"Article 7173 is the only Texas statute other 
than Article 5248 which authorizes a tax on lessees. 
It provides in part that: 
" 'Property held under a lease for a term of 
three years or more, or held under a contract for 
the purchase thereof, belonging to this state, or that 
is exempt by law fron1 taxation in the hands of the 
owner thereof, shall be considered for all the pur-
poses of taxation, as the property of the person so 
holding the same, except as otherwise specially pro-
vided by law.' 
"As construed by the Texas courts, Article 7173 
is less burdensome than Article 5248 in three re-
spects. First, the measure of a tax under Article 
7173 is not the full value of leased tax-exempt prem-
ises, as it apparently is under Article 5248, but 
only the price the taxable leasehold would bring 
at a fair voluntary sale for cash - the value of the 
leasehold itself. Second, by its very terms, Article 
7173 imposes no tax on a lessee whose lease is for 
a term of less than three years. Finally, and cru-
cial here, a lease for three years or longer but sub-
ject - like Phillips' - to termination at the les-
sor's option in the event of a sale is not 'a lease for 
a term of three years or more' for purposes of Ar-
ticle 7173. Trammel v. Faught, 74 Tex. 557, 12 S. 
\V. 317. Therefore, because of the termination pro-
visions in its lease, Phillips could not be taxed un-
der Article 7173." 
None of the factors noted in the cited case are present in 
the instant case. State leases are taxed at the same value 
as federal leases and 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953 makes no 
distinction between state and federal governmental leases. 
59-13-74, U. C. A. 1953, provides: 
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"The tax imposed upon such possession or other 
beneficial use of tax-exempt property shall be in 
the same amount and to the same extent as the ad 
valorem property tax would be if the possessor or 
user were the owner thereof; provided that there 
shall be credited against the tax so imposed upon the 
beneficial use of property owned by the federal gov-
ernment the amount of any payments which are 
made in lieu of taxes." 
The tax imposed in the uniform ad valorem rate, and is 
equally applied to all property. 
At trial, the respondents-cross-appellants argued that 
59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, carved out an exception for state 
lessees and purchasers of state lands under contract. 59-
2-2 provides : 
"No tax shall be levied upon lands, the title to 
which remains in the state, held or occupied by any 
person under a contract of sale or lease from the 
state, but this provision shall not be construed to 
prevent the taxation of improvements on such lands 
and an interest therein to the extent of money paid, 
or due, in part payment of the purchase price 
thereof, whether an extension of payment has been 
granted or not prior to the levying of such tax. 
Where final payment has been made upon such 
lands, the contract of sale shall, for the purpose of 
taxation, be regarded as passing title to the pur-
chaser or assignee, and the state land board shall 
immediately certify the receipt of such final pay-
ment to the state tax commission." 
As can be seen, the tax under this statute on state lands 
sold under contract or leased is only to the extent of the 
equity and/or improvements of the holder. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
39 
The trial judge found that 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, had 
been impliedly repealed by 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953 to the 
degree that the latter statute was inconsistent with the 
former. Thus, the trial court would properly have 59-2-2, 
U. C. A. 1953 apply to the sale or lease of state lands where 
the possessor was not using or possessing the lands in con-
junction with the business conducted for profit. If the 
lands were being used by the contract vendee for such 
commerdr.l enterprises, as would invoke 59-13-73, U. C. A. 
1953, then they would be subject to the privilege tax valua-
tion, and not just the value of the purchaser's equity. In-
deed, were any different construction given the statute a 
difference in the tax assessment valuation would exist be-
tween lessees and beneficial possessors of federal lands 
and those of state lands. This would obviously render the 
Privilege Tax discriminatory and hence unconstitutional. 
In Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U. S. 
376 (1960), the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
if such a divergence in tax burden existed by state statute, 
the assessment on consequent tax would be unconstitutional. 
It noted: 
"However, all lessees of exempt public lands 
would appear to belong to the class defined by Ar-
ticle 7173. In view of the fact that lessees in this 
class are taxed because they use exempt property 
for a nonexempt purpose, they appear to be simi-
larly situated and presumably should be taxed alike. 
Yet by the amendment of Article 5248, the Texas 
Legislature segregated federal lessees and imposed 
on them a heavier tax burden than is imposed on 
the other members of the class by Article 7173. In 
this case the resulting difference in tax, attendant 
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upon the identity of Phillips' lessor, is extreme; the 
State and the School District concede that Phillips 
would not be taxed at all if its lessor were the State 
or one of its political subdivisions instead of the 
Federal Government. The discrimination against 
the United States and its lessee seems apparent." 
The court noted that the Texas tax was not a tax, the 
incidence of which fell upon the United States, and held it 
not subject to attack on that basis. However, the court met 
the discrimination issue head on, saying: 
"It is true that perfection is by no means re-
quired under the equal protection test of permissible 
classification. But we have made it clear, in the 
equal protection cases, that our decisions in that 
field are not necessarily controlling where problems 
of intergovernmental tax immunity are involved. 
In Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, (U. S.) 
supra, for example, we noted that the State was 
'dealing with [its] proper domestic concerns, and 
not trenching upon the prerogatives of the National 
Government.' 358 U. S. at 526. When such is the 
case, the State's power to classify is, indeed, ex-
tremely broad, and its discretion is limited only by 
constitutional rights and by the doctrine that a 
classification may not be palpably arbitrary. Id. 
358 U. S. at 526-528. But where taxation of the 
private use of the Government's property is con-
cerned, the Government's interests must be weighed 
in the balance. Accordingly, it does not seem too 
much to require that the State treat those who deal 
with the Government as well as it treats those with 
whom it deals inself." 
In Moses Lake Homes v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744 
(1961), the United States Supreme Court held a Washing-
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ton tax illegal because the assessment against leaseholds 
of federal leases is not the same as leaseholds of state' 
leases. The court noted : 
"In addition to the weight properly to be ac-
corded to the conclusions of the two courts below 
that Washington imposes a higher tax on Wherry 
Act leaseholds than on other similar leaseholds, it is 
eminently clear that this is so." 
Thus, the decision of Judge Jones that 59-13-73, U. 
C. A. 1953, repealed 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, to the degree of 
any inconsistent discrimination avoided any disparity be-
hH'l'n the two stautes, and consequently avoided the de-
cisions of the Moses Lake & Phillips Chemical cases, supra. 
The respondents contended this construction was er-
roneous, but it is submitted the construction was in per-
fect accord with recognized canons of statutory construc-
tion, and the legislative intent and purpose. 
If the trial court's construction and findings are erron-
eous, the burden of proving such impropriety and conse-
quently the burden of proving the general unconstitution-
ality of the Utah Privilege Tax, 59-13-73, 74, 75, etc., U. 
C. A. 1953, rests upon the respondents and cross-appellants. 
Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 
P. 2d 477 (1948). It is also a general canon of statutory 
construction that if there are two possible constructions 
of a statute, one of which will render the statute constitu-
tional, and the other unconstitutional or render the consti-
tutionality doubtful, the interpretation will be adopted 
which will save the statute. Howe v. State Tax Commis-
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sion, 10 U. 2d 362, 353 P. 2d 468 (1960); State Water 
Pollution Control Bd. v. Salt Lake City, 6 U. 2d 247, 311 
P. 2d 370 (1957); Donahue v. Warner Brothers Pictures, 2 
U. 2d 256, 272 P. 2d 177 ( 1954). Most recently in Rothfels 
V. Southworth, 11 U. 2d 169, 356 P. 2d 612 ( 1960), this 
court noted : 
"Closely related to the doctrine just stated is 
the well recognized rule of statutory construction 
that if statutes can be given different reasonable 
interpretations, under one of which they would be 
constitutional and under the other their constitu-
tionality would be doubtful, the former will be 
adopted. * * *" 
Unless the opposite construction is clear and unmis-
takable, no statute will be struck as being unconstitutional. 
Gubler v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 113 Utah 
188, 192 P. 2d 580 ( 1948) . All doubts should be resolved 
in favor of constitutionality, State v. Guerts, 11 U. 2d 421, 
360 P. 2d 1018 (1961); Salt Lake City v. Tax Commission, 
11 U. 2d 359, 359 P. 2d 397 (1961). The Supreme Court 
must give a statute a construction that will uphold the stat-
ute's constitutionality if reasonably possible. Munsee v. 
Munsee, 12 U. 2d 83, 363 P. 2d 71; Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railway Company v. Central Weber Sewer Im-
provement District, 4 U. 2d 105, 287 P. 2d 884; Tygesen 
v. Magna Water Company, 119 Utah 274, 226 P. 2d 127; 
Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers Retirement 
Commission, 117 Utah 557, 218 P. 2d 287; Allen v. Merrell, 
6 U. 2d 32, 305 P. 2d 490. Indeed authority in this juris· 
diction requires the courts to be convinced beyond a rea· 
sonable doubt before striking the constitutionality of a stat-
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ute. In State Board of Education v. Commission of Fi-
nance, 122 Utah 164, 247 P. 2d 435 ( 1952), this court noted: 
""' • • It should be borne in mind that we 
have a duty to uphold legislative acts unless we are 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that they are 
unconstitutional." 
It may be generally conceded that repeal by implica-
tion is not favored. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 
Srd Ed., Sec. 2014. However, in the instant case there is 
evidence of a real intent on the part of the Legislature to 
anticipate implied repeal, especially where necessary to 
sustain the overall contemplated statutory purpose. Suther-
land, op. cit., Sec. 2014 (1962 Supp.) notes: 
"The presumption against implied repeals is 
overcome, however, by a showing that the two acts 
are irreconcilable, clearly repugnant as to vital mat-
ters to which they relate, and so inconsistent that 
the two cannot have concurrent operation." 
See Golconda Lead Mines v. Null, 82 Idaho 96, 350 P. 2d 
221 (1960); Rydalch v. Glauner, 357 P. 2d 1094 (Idaho 
1961). Sutherland, supra, Sec. 2012, p. 463, also notes : 
"When a subsequent enactment covering a field 
of operation coterminous with a prior statute can-
not by any reasonable construction be given effect 
while the prior law remains in operative existence 
because of irreconcilable conflict between the two 
acts, the latest legislative expression prevails, and 
the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict." 
Utah has apparently adopted the above rule. In Union Pac. 
R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P. 
2d 469 (1943), the court commented: 
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"It is elementary that statutes may be repealed 
by implication, and where the provisions of a later 
statute are clearly and manifestly repugnant to the 
provisions of existing statutes the latter are deemed 
repealed to the extent of such repugnancy. * * *" 
In the instant case we have just such a repugnancy as 
would render 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953 unconstitutional 
in the absence of implied repeal. The construction for 
implied repeal (if there has not been an express one) 
should, therefore, be favored. 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, 
was originally enacted as statehood. R. S. 1898, Sec. 
2502, and with minor modification (L. 1919, Ch. 113, 
Sec. 1: 1921, Ch. 132, Sec. 1), has remained the same 
since that time. On the other hand, 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, 
was passed after the decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court in the Michigan cases, referred to heretofore. 
It was part of a general effort on the part of states all 
over the country to avail themselves of this new available 
source of revenue to meet their increased tax demands. 
The Aftermath Of The Michigan Tax Decisions: State 
Taxation of Federal Property and Activities, 13 Military 
L. Rev. 167, 169 (1961). The Utah statute was closely 
patterned on the Michigan statute and was aimed at cov-
ering all sources of tax revenue which had otherwise es-
caped assessment because the title, as distinct from the 
beneficial use, rested in a tax exempt entity. The act was 
passed by the 1959 Legislature in Special Session, Chapter 
5, Sec. 4 ( SS) . The act became effective December 31, 
1959 (L. 1959 (SS), Ch. 5, Sec. 6). It was specific legis-
lation and subsequent in time to the previous statute re· 
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lating to state lands. Since 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953 was 
later in time, more extensive in scope and specific in pur-
post>, it would govern in the face of an irreconcilable con-
flict. In State v. Betensen, 14 U. 2d 121, 378 P. 2d 669 
( 1963), this court commented on a later statute requiring 
county attorneys to be licensed, qualified attorneys where 
a prior statute, still on the books, apparently exempted 
them: 
"* * * This provision, incidentally, was not 
expressly repealed by the statute here in question. 
Although if the latter were a valid enactment, it 
would undoubtedly supersede the former as being 
in conflict and later in time. * * *" 
Consequently, the factual pattern of the statutes here 
in question being of the same nature, leads to the conclu-
sion that 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, impliedly repeals 59-2-2, 
U. C. A. 1953, to the extent of any inconsistency. The trial 
court's obviously correct construction should stand. 
However, an additional reason offers much impetus 
for reaching such a conclusion. 59-13-77, U. C. A. 1953, 
the last provision in the Privilege Tax Act, provides : 
"Nothing contained herein shall be construed 
as limiting or repealing the exemptions granted in 
sections 59-2-4, 59-2-5, 59-2-6, 59-2-7, 59-2-8, 59-2-9, 
59-2-12 and 59-2-13 Utah Code Annotated 1953." 
This section expressly limits the applicability of 59-13-73, 
U. C. A. 1953, etc. in the face of the exemptions in Title 
59, Chapter 2. However, 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, is not men-
tioned, obviously demonstrating a legislative intention that 
the provisions of the Privilege Tax Act would limit or re-
peal the exemptions of 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953 to the degree 
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of any inconsistency. By not mentioning 59-2-2, but men-
tioning and exempting other companion provisions, the Leg-
islature obviously intended a repeal of any inconsistency 
between 59-13-73 and those statutes not mentioned. Ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius. This is as much as an 
express repeal. A fortiori, the trial court's construction was 
in full accord with constitutional law, canons of statutory 
construction, and the legislative purpose and intent.4 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THERE HAD BEEN SUCH A DISCRIM-
INATORY APPLICATION OF 59-13-73, U. C. A. 
1953, AS TO VOID THE ASSESSMENT AND 
TAX, AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH FINDING 
WAS PROPER, THE COURT ERRED IN THE 
RELIEF GRANTED. 
The trial court made a finding that the application of 
the privilege tax under 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, was dis-
criminatory and that, as a consequence, the levy was "il-
legal and void" (R. 250). The court in its oral findings 
stated the basis of the alleged discrimination (R. 200): 
"* * * These state land contracts, gentle-
men, under the stipulation of the parties there are 
about 200 or some such number of these contracts 
4Respondents' assertion of an administrative interp~etation to the cont~ry 
is not well founded since: ( 1 ) There was no ev1dence of a contrary ~~­
terpretation. (2) Even if local assessors had so construed t~e statutes ~IS 
is hardly binding or persuasive constt:nction. (3) No long htstory of legiS· 
lative acquiescence exists. In addition, at least one assessor had construed 
the statutes the same as Judge Jones, this was the Kane County A~~· 
This fact was not known till after trial, but is a proper subject of JUdiCial 
notice. 
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that the court has examined, which if the court re-
calls correctly there's about that number where the 
purchaser of these state lands in 1961 placed those 
lands to commercial use. The court finds from the 
stipulation that this was a commercial use, but 
nothing was done collectively by those tax people. 
I'll just treat them collectively as tax people, be-
cause the Tax Commission ~as supervisory duties 
under the Constitution and the assessor has, I guess, 
primary responsibility. But collectively in all the 
counties of the state there apparently has been a 
studied indifference over these state land contracts, 
and notwithstanding the fact that the Land Board 
is across the hall or on another floor, somehow or 
other, though these lands are being used for graz-
ing of animals and used in commercial practice, in 
not one instance, if the court recalls the record cor-
rectly, has any assessment been made under this 
privilege tax. 
"Now the court is just simply impelled into the 
conclusion that so long as the state is going to con-
tinue to practice such discrimination, the least this 
court can do is to raise its voice in protest and de-
cide in favor of the plaintiff and find that the tax 
has been discriminatorily applied and with reluct-
ance direct that the money be returned with the in-
terest provided by statute. * * *" 
It ruled that because of such action, the assessment 
against Thiokol was nullified (R. 201) and void (R. 
250), and that Thiokol was entitled to the return of all 
monies paid under protest. It is submitted that this de-
termination was error in two respects. First, it is submitted 
that the trial court erred in finding that there was suffi-
cient evidence of discrimination as to warrant the court in 
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granting relief; and, second, it is submitted that the relief 
granted was improper. 
As respects the first point, the evidence disclosed that 
none of the lands which the State of Utah had sold, under 
certificate of sale but retaining title in the State, had been 
taxed under 59-13-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953, at their 
full value rather than the purchaser's equity. 5 No evidence 
was introduced to show that any federal contracts of sale 
of public lands had been taxed differently in a similar situ-
ation nor, additionally, was there any evidence that lands 
under contract of sale from other tax exempt entities had 
been taxed. No evidence was introduced to show the propor-
tion the state lands bore to all the property taxable under 
59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953. Thiokol was taxed on personal prop-
erty not realty and holds such property by permit of contract 
not a contract of sale. Consequently, there could be no di-
rect injury to Thiokol or the United States by the failure 
to tax state contract lands, since there was no evidence that 
either respondent had any similar property in that cate-
gory that was taxed. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 
supra. 84 C. J. S., Taxation, Sec. 36. If any injury 
can be claimed, it could only be claimed because of 
the fact that such state lands come generally within the 
category of taxable properties under the statute, which is 
insufficient to show discrimination injurious to respon-
dents. Moreover, it is submitted that the evidence of dis· 
crimination, if the above be such, was not of a nature as 
5Qutside of Kane County, which appellant understands did tax cont~~ 
lands 59-13-73, U. C. A. 19 53, no dispute is made by appellant WI 
this finding. 
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would constitute legal discrimination entitling the respon-
dents to relief. There was not one scintilla of evidence to 
show an intentional discrimination against the respondents. 
The only evidence with respect to the intent or attitude of 
any county assessor was the testimony of Fred L. Peterson, 
the Box Elder County Assessor (R. 139, et seq.). He testi-
fied that upon receipt of the list of state lands, he com-
puted the equity of the purchaser and assessed for the year 
( R. l·ll). He made no visual inspection of the lands, but 
did make reference to a map that had been prepared a few 
years earlier to aid in his assessment (R. 143, 154). He 
had no specific knowledge of what use was being made of 
lands by any contract vendee (R. 156). He further testi-
fied (R. 157) : 
"Q. Mr. Peterson, was it your understanding 
that users of property owned by the State of Utah 
as well as users of property owned by the United 
States of America were subject to the tax provided 
for by section 59-13-73 of the Utah Code when you 
made your assessments for the year 1961? 
"A. Would that apply to what the land is used 
for and the assessed-
"Q. Assuming that the land was being used in 
connection with a business for profit. 
"A. All livestock ranging on this exempt land 
are all assessed. That together with the equipment, 
camps, and otherwise used on this land is assessed. 
"Q. Assessed under what section of the Code? 
"A. I don't know the Code, but then that -
just the same as other properties are assessed. 
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"Q. They're assessed as personal property? 
"A. As personal property, yes, sir. 
"Q. And they were assessed in the same man-
ner after December 31, 1959, as they were prior to 
that? 
"A. That's right, yes, sir. 
"Q. So the manner and extent to which you 
assess such property was not changed by the advent 
of section 59-13-73 of the Utah Code, to which ref-
erence was made at the assessors' school held in 
December of 1959, and in this exhibit seven which 
you looked at earlier? 
"A. Well, that's a long time to remember, but 
I've interpreted that to mean that it would apply to, 
as I say, livestock and equipment or otherwise used 
on this particular property, would be assessed at its 
value as other property. 
"Q. But not assessed because it was govern-
ment property that was being used; the livestock 
was not government property, was it? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. It was being assessed as property of the 
livestock operator? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And the land which the State of Utah 
owned and which the livestock operator has pur· 
chased under contract was not assessed to him? 
"A. Just the equity." 
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He had made inquiry as to one piece of property under 
lease by Brigham City, a gravel pit, and was informed that 
it was taxable ( R. 177), but had failed to tax it due to 
.. oversight" (R. 179). Therefore, his testimony directly 
shows that any failure to tax other properties than state 
contract lands was oversight, and as to state lands under 
contract, he did not know the law made them taxable under 
59-1::>·73, U. C. A. 1953. 
The director of the property tax division of the State 
Tax Commission, Mr. Max H. Kerr, testified that state 
policy was to tax all lands that the Tax Commission was 
made aware of that would be properly taxed (R. 98). He 
testified ( R. 98) : 
"A. There's no difference between whether it 
is owned by the federal government or any other 
so-called exempt owner. 
"Q. Otherwise then there is a general across-
the-board exercise of this tax rather than attempt-
ing to pinpoint it into any particular tax exempt 
entity; is that correct? 
"A. That is true." 
He further testified that when the act was passed, the state 
set up an assessor's school and expressly advised assessors 
that private possessory interest of persons holding from 
government and other non-taxable entities were to be taxed 
(R. 99). No policy of exclusion of state lands was directed 
or intended by the State (R. 100). He testified that he had 
never considered the question of whether installment con-
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tract purchases of state lands would or would not be sub-
ject to taxation (R. 106) : 
"A. I don't think that I have specifically con-
sidered that hypothetical case before." 
Clearly, the evidence allows for only two assumptions. 
First, as to any specific property leased by a municipality 
or other tax exempt entity, any failure to assess and tax 
the holder in accordance with 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, 
where the holder could be validly assessed, was due to mere 
oversight. Second, as to contract vendees of state lands, 
using or possessing the lands in conjunction with a business 
conducted for profit, any failure to tax was due to a mis-
take or oversight in the coverage of the law. The general 
rule of law in this area is summarized in 84 C. J. S., Taxa-
tion, Sec. 30, p. 103 : 
"* * * Since equality of assessment is an 
ideal which is impossible of realization, as discussed 
supra subdivision a of this section, it has been 
held that, in the assessment of property, mere omis-
sions, mistakes, oversights, or errors of judgment of 
the taxing officials in the exercise of an honest 
judgment will not invalidate the assessment; but 
there must be something more, something which in 
effect amounts to an intentional violation of the 
principle of practical uniformity, which may be 
made out by showing that other property was uni-
formly and systematically assessed at a percentage 
of its fair cash value lower than that of the com-
plaining party. In other words, unlawful discr~­
ination by tax officials consists, not merely of mis-
take or lack of diligence in seeking out those who 
are subject to tax, but of an intentional discrimina-
tion adopted as a practice." 
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In this state the rule was expressed in Continental 
Nat·ional Bank of Salt Lake City v. Naylor, 54 Utah 49, 
179 P. 67: 
''We find no substantial evidence whatever of 
intention or design on the part of the assessor or 
board of equalization to discriminate against ap-
pellant and other banks, or their stockholders, by 
the adoption of wrong principles, standards, or 
methods, or in any other respect. Even if we could 
find that there was some apparent discrimination 
in point of fact by which appellant and other banks 
and their stockholders were required to pay some-
thing more than was required of taxpayers on some 
other classes of property, still, as we understand 
the authorities, appellant would have no standing in 
a court of equity to restrain the collection of the 
tax unless the discrimination resulted from wrong 
principles, methods, or standards, willfully and in-
tentionally adopted. Discriminations resulting from 
mistake, inadvertence, and miscalculations or error 
of judgment must be remedied in some other form 
of proceeding than the one adopted by appellant in 
the case at bar." (Emphasis added.) 
In Alfred J. Su:eet, Inc. v. City of Auburn, 180 Atl. 803 
(Me., 1935), the Supreme Court of Maine stated: 
"(In cases involving attacks on assessment) 
(t)he burden is on the petitioner to show that the 
valuation is unjust, not on the assessors to estab-
lish that their figures are correct. The presumption 
is that the assessment is valid. Penobscot Chemical 
Fibre Co. v. Inhabitants of the Town of Bradley, 
99 Me. 263, 59 A. 83; Spear v. City of Bath, supra; 
City of Roanoke v. Williams, supra; Sunday Lake 
Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 
38 S. Ct. 495, 62 L. Ed. 1154. 
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"It is furthermore generally recognized that it 
is not sufficient to show merely that the taxing 
board has made an error, even though such mistake 
may result in a lack of uniformity. Penobscot 
Chemical Fibre Co. v. Inhabitants of the Town of 
Bradley, supra; Maish v. Territory of Arizona, 164 
U. S. 599, 17 S. Ct. 193, 41 L. Ed. 567; Sioux City 
Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441, 43 S. 
Ct. 190, 67 L. Ed. 340, 28 A. L. R. 979. The reason 
for such a doctrine is obvious. Mathematical pre-
cision is impossible in dealing with taxable values. 
Uniformity can only be approximated. The court 
is not a board of review to correct errors. It is solely 
where there is evident a systematic purpose on the 
part of a taxing board to cast a disproportionate 
share of the public burden on one taxpayer, or one 
class of taxpayers, that the court will intervene. In 
Shawmut Manufacturing Co. v. Town of Benton, 
123 Me. 121, 130, 122 A. 49, 53, this principle has 
been definitely enunciated in the following language, 
quoting with approval the words of Chief Justice 
Taft in Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 
supra: 'The proving of a mere error of human 
judgment, as has been indicated, will not support 
a claim of overrating; "there must be something 
more-something which in effect amount to an in-
tentional violation of the essential principle of prac-
tical uniformity."'" 
The federal rule is no different, the evidence must 
manifest a clear and intentional discrimination before the 
assessment is held to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
In Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441, 
447 (1923), the United States Supreme Court commented 
that: 
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••• • • mere errors of judgment do not sup-
port a claim of discrimination, but that there must 
be something more,-something which, in effect, 
amounts to an intentional violation of the essential 
principle of practical uniformity. Sunday Lake Iron 
Co. v. Walkefield Twp., 247 U. S. 350, 353, 62 L. 
Ed. 1154, 1156, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495." 
In Su.nday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352 
( 1918), the court noted: 
uThe purpose of the equal protection clause of 
the 14th Amendment is to secure every person with-
in the· state's jurisdiction against intentional and 
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by ex-
press terms of a statue or by its improper execution 
through duly constituted agents. And it must be 
regarded as settled that intentional systematic un-
dervaluation by state officials of other taxable prop-
erty in the same class contravenes the constitutional 
right of one taxed upon the full value of his prop-
erty." 
Consequently, unless the conduct of state officials is an 
intentional and systematic discrimination against one tax-
payer in the same tax class, no violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause or uniformity provisions is made out. See 
Inequality in Property Tax Assessments: New Cures for 
ata Old Ill. 75 Harvard L. Rev. 1374 (1962). 
Applying the above rules to the instant case, it is clear 
that no evidence was before the trial court of any deliber-
ate, intentional, systematic exclusion. What in fact there 
was, was an oversight as to some property, and a mistake 
as to the extent of the application of a new law. Certainly, 
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this is not sufficient evidence of discrimination to sustain 
an attack against an assessment, especially where there 
was no showing that similar property of the same class of 
the plaintiff or intervenor had been taxed. 
Finally, it is submitted that even if the evidence were 
sufficient to sustain a claim of discrimination, the remedy 
the trial court granted the respondents, to wit: return of 
all monies paid, was improper. It was urged by the respon-
dents at trial that if such discrimination were shown, it 
would render the assessment void. Reliance for that posi-
tion was placed on Moses Lake Homes v. Grant County, 365 
U. S. 744 (1961); and Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas, 361 
u. s. 376 (1960). 
In Moses Lake Homes, the court noted: 
"In addition to the weight properly to be ac-
corded to the conclusions of the two courts below 
that Washington imposes a higher tax on Wherry 
Act leaseholds than on other similar leaseholds, it 
is eminently clear that this is so." 
In the Phillips Chemical Co. case, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
"As construed by the Texas courts, Article 7173 
is less burdensome than Article 5248 in three re· 
spects." 
Where there is statutory discrimination, this would 
obviously be unconstitutional, and hence void. But, the 
situation in the instant case does not involve a decision of 
the court of prima facie disharmony. Rather, the court 
ruled all properties were covered under 59-13-73, Utab 
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Code Annotated 1953, and should be taxed at full value. 
Therefore, in the instant case, the discrimination, if any, 
is one of administrative misapplication. In such cases, it 
is clear that the remedy of the taxpayer is not to have re-
turned all his money, since this would put him in a better 
position than others and all he is entitled to is to be placed 
in a generally equal position. Therefore, the courts allow 
a reduction to the level of other properties assessed. In 
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, supra, the Su-
preme Court ruled : 
'' * * * This court holds that the right of 
the taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at 100 
per cent of its true value is to have his assessment 
reduced to the percentage of that value at which 
others are taxed, even though this is a departure 
from the requirement of statute. The conclusion is 
based on the principle that where it is impossible 
to secure both the standards of the true value, and 
the uniformity and equality required by law, the 
latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and 
ultimate purpose of the law." 
See also Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 
620 (1945). In Des Moines Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239 
(1931), the Supreme Court did not declare the assessment 
void where discrimination was found, but allowed petition-
ers to obtain "the excess of taxes exacted from them." In 
Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board, 284 U. S. 23, 30 (1931), the 
Supreme Court, after finding discrimination, ruled : 
"The petitioners are entitled to a readjustment 
of the assessments of their coal so as to put these 
assessments upon a basis of equality, with due re-
gard to differences in actual value, with other as-
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sessments of the coal of the same class within the 
tax district." 
Several state courts have assumed a similar rule. In re 
Brooks Building, 391 Pa. 94, 137 A. 2d 273 (1958); In the 
Matter of Kents, 34 N. J. 21, 166 A. 2d 763 (1961). It is 
noted in 75 Harvard L. Rev. 1374, 1376, supra: 
"* * * As a result of these Supreme Court 
decisions, the state courts generally have recognized 
-albeit with startling exceptions-that the Four· 
teenth Amendment forbids intentionally unequal as-
sessment as between properties of the same class 
and entitles a taxpayer who has proved such dis-
crimination to a reduction to the level at which com-
parable parcels have been assessed." (McCluskey 
v. Sparks, 80 Ariz. 15, 291 P. 2d 791 (1955); An-
derson v. Dunn, 180 Kan. 811, 308 P. 2d 154 
( 1957); Baldwin Const. Co. v. Essex County Bd. of 
Taxation, 16 N. J. 329, 108 A. 2d 598 (1954) .) 
Consequently, if there was in fact discrimination, the 
court should have determined the percentage value that the 
assessment to Thiokol bore to the average percentage assess-
ment to the non-assessed property and granted a reduction, 
if any, in the excess amount and judgment only for that 
amount. This court could direct such action if it deemed 
it proper. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court obviously was correct in upholding the 
constitutionality of 59-13-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
and ruling that it impliedly repealed 59-2-2, Utah Code An-
notated 1953, to the extent of conflict. However, the trial 
court erred in finding sufficient intentional discrimination, 
or, in the alternative, in the relief awarded. 
It is submitted this court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, 
0. DEE LUND, 
Box Elder County Attorney, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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